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Probabilistic Risk Assessment of life safety for a six-storey commercial building 
with an open stair interconnecting four storeys: A case study 
Abstract 
The gold standard for complying Performance Requirements is based on a Quantitative Probabilistic 
Risk Assessment (QPRA) method. This case study demonstrates the application of this approach to 
performance based design of a six-storey commercial building with an open stair interconnecting four 
storeys. Computational Fluid Dynamics (CFD) based and zone fire as well as evacuation simulations 
are used to quantify consequences whilst detailed event trees underpinned by statistical data and 
analysis are utilised to calculate corresponding probabilities. Results are combined in a trade-off 
analysis tool which calculates the Expected Risk to Life (ERL) based on the trial design features included 
in each design option. The approach was used to determine a preferred design that achieves an 
acceptably low ERL and compliance with the Performance Requirements of the Building Code of 
Australia (BCA). The benchmark ERL was set as 1.36 deaths/1000 fires or a probability of death from 
a fire of 1.36 x 10-3 based on local statistical data. To obtain an optimum fire safety design (Alternative 
Solution) a layered approach was adopted in which fire safety systems were added until the risk to 
occupants in the building due to a fire is the same or less than the benchmark ERL. Eventually three 
sets of trial design were considered and in all cases the calculated ERL were roughly 22% lower than 
the benchmark.  Eventually the trial design with the least number of fire safety systems were 
recommended as the Alternative Solution. The trade-off analysis shows the sprinklers and wall-
wetting sprinklers in the office area resulted in a 20-fold difference in the building wide ERL, each.  
1 Introduction 
In order to comply with the Building Code of Australia (BCA) [1], a building design must comply with 
the Deemed to Satisfy (DtS) provisions of the code or otherwise demonstrate that the underlying 
Performance Requirements of the BCA have been met. Performance-based designed buildings offer 
more flexibility to the fire safety engineers to adopt new design concepts and technologies to improve 
aesthetic and acoustic values, material and energy efficiencies, and cost effectiveness while complying 
with regulatory building codes.  
The gold standard for complying Performance Requirements is based on a Quantitative Probabilistic 
Risk Assessment (QPRA) method [2-4]. Such methods have been used in fire safety engineering in 
Australia since the early 1990s [5, 6], though not frequently. The release of the ABCB’s draft proposal 
on the verification method [7] has generated renewed interest in applying QPRA for the verification 
of performance requirement.  In recent years, probabilistic method has been used for the aspects of 
evacuation [8, 9] and structural design [10-13]. For cost-benefit analysis also probabilistic method was 
used [14, 15]. Some recent research has highlighted probability based quantification of various aspects 
of fire safety engineering [16-21].  Examples of application of comprehensive QPRA on a performance-
based designed building are rare in archival journals. In this study, a unique approach has been taken 
that involved the development of a QPRA tool which calculates the Expected Risk to Life (ERL) [5, 22] 
based on the desired design features which have been included in the various alternative designs. ERL 
calculations were underpinned by results from Computational Fluid Dynamics (CFD) based and zone 
fire models as well as an evacuation model for the nominated fire scenarios and design features under 
investigation. This allowed for consideration of the design features necessary to achieve an acceptably 
low ERL. 
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Other quantitative risk assessment techniques such as F-N curves for acceptance criteria [23] and/or 
Monte Carlo Simulation [8] for probabilistic risk calculations can also be applied to this case study. 
The case study presented outlines fire safety issues associated with a six-storey commercial building 
with an open stair interconnecting 4 storeys and the likely Performance Solution based on a hazard 
analysis and quantitative assessment of the safety levels for various alternative building designs. The 
International Fire Engineering Guidelines (IFEG) [22] has been used to provide reference to the fire 
engineering process and assessment methodologies.  This case study is used as an example so that 
the same design approach can be applied to other types of building.  This will encourage technical 
practitioners to increase the adoption rate of QPRA methodology for real life buildings and to elucidate 
the methodology to regulators and legal practitioners.   
2 Methodology Used 
The methodology used in this case study is quantitative, absolute and probabilistic. The aim of the 
assessment is to demonstrate that the risk to occupants in the event of a fire in the subject building 
will be less than the ERL taken from past statistical data involving fires in a similar building.  Risk is 
often calculated as the product of probability and consequence [24]. Probability can be determined 
by statistical data and reliability studies. Consequence can be calculated using CFD/zone and 
evacuation modelling or expert judgement. The ERL is quantified in terms of the number of expected 
deaths caused by fire over the life of the building.   
The QPRA tool is predominantly based on event trees. Based on hazard analysis, various fire scenarios 
are developed. After an initial qualitative risk assessment, some scenarios are nominated for CFD and 
evacuation modelling as shown in Figure 1(a). Event trees are then developed based on the fire 
scenarios. Depending on the failure of various fire safety measures (detection, suppression, window 
breakage, barrier failure etc), various branches of the event tree are evolved as exemplified in Figure 
1(b).  The probabilities (PXX in Figure 1b) of occurring different branches need to be determined by 
historical data and/or fault tree analysis.  
Each end node of an event tree will have a probability and a quantitative design fire. A design fire is 
the representation of fire severity in terms of heat release rate (HRR) and time. It is to be noted that 
HRR is the most important parameter for fire safety analysis [25-27] which can be derived using 
various correlations [22].  The design fire becomes the main input into the CFD or zone model and 
associated product yields from fire (such CO yield, CO2 yield, soot yield etc which can be obtained 
from bench-scale experiments and/or various databases) are also provided as the inputs.  
The CFD/zone model analyses give us by what time untenable condition (in terms of heat flux, room 
temperature, toxicity etc) is reached for a particular fire scenario and design fire. An evacuation model 
calculates how many occupant can evacuate to a safe place by that time. The rests are considered as 
casualty and hence, consequence. So for each end node we can have a probability and consequence. 
This whole set up of event tree, fault tree, fire modelling and evacuation modelling can be regarded 
as the risk model. 
The risk to occupants is determined by multiplying the consequence by the probability for each end 
node in the risk model.  When we add risks of all end nodes, we get the cumulative risk which is known 
as the ERL (Figure 1b). In summary, the ERL is calculated as follows: 
a. Event trees were used to calculate the probability of all possible outcomes for each scenario; 
b. Corresponding design fires were assigned at appropriate junctures in the event tree to account 
for those events effecting the magnitude of the fire such as sprinkler activation. 
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(a) Risk Modelling Approach 
 
(b) Calculation of ERL from an event tree 
Figure 1.  Overall QPRA approach 
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c. Fire modelling was used to calculate tenability levels over time for each of the identified scenarios; 
d. Evacuation modelling was performed for each scenario; 
e. Corresponding evacuation and fire simulation results were overlaid (essentially an Available Safe 
Egress Time, ASET/ Required Safe Egress Time, RSET analysis) to determine the number of 
casualties (i.e. the consequence) for each event tree outcome; 
f. The probability, encompassing the likelihood of initiating events, and consequence of all possible 
outcomes for each scenario were used to calculate the ERL. 
Fire brigade intervention (FBI) has also been considered as some performance requirements of the 
BCA, namely (1) CP1 Structural stability during a fire; (2) CP2 Avoiding spread of fire; and (3) EP2.2 
Evacuation time of occupants are related to FBI. Therefore, the use of the Fire Brigade Intervention 
Model (FBIM) forms part of the assessment in order to provide a quantification of the fire hazard 
exposure to fire brigade personal during their search and rescue tasks. 
Finally a trade-off tool  has been developed to enable the analysis of trial design features to determine 
the preferred solution and its associated ERL based on the simulation results, and underpinned by 
statistical data. 
It is recognised that in some jurisdictions, a design that is proven to reduce risk to an absolute value 
may not be adequate. An alternative approach may be to demonstrate that risks have been reduced 
So Far As Is Reasonably Practicable (SFAIRP) [28, 29].  The methods used in this paper may be suitable 
to compare the risks from several trial concept designs however a separate framework may be 
required if risks are required to be reduced SFAIRP [30]. 
It is also recognized that the results from the QPRA are highly dependent on the inputs provided. It is 
extremely important to acknowledge and account for all uncertainties associated with the inputs. This 
can be achieved through several ways – one example is to analyse a range of range of values for each 
input as part of a sensitivity analysis. Another is to represent the range of possible values for each 
input parameter as appropriately quantified numerical distributions, then perform calculations using 
Monte Carlo or equivalent simulation to determine probabilistic results. 
 
Figure 2 – BCA Classification, Rise in Storeys and Effective Height 
3 Building Description  
The proposed building, as shown in Figure 2, consists of a mixed used retail and office development 
comprising a rise in storeys of six (6) as per clause C1.2 of the BCA [31]. In accordance with clause C1.1 
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of the BCA, based on the rise in storeys (6) and the relevant building classifications the proposed 
building is to comprise of Type ‘A’ construction as defined by Specification C1.1 of the BCA.  
Buildings of Type ‘A’ construction are required to have non-combustible external wall, common wall, 
floor and floor-framing lift pit, non-load bearing walls (required to be fire-resisting) and non-load 
bearing lift, ventilation, pipe, garbage, and the like shafts (which do not discharge hot products of 
combustion). In addition, all load bearing internal walls (including shaft walls) and load bearing fire 
walls need to be either masonry or concrete. The Architect and Structural Engineer have defined the 
building architectural/structural characteristics for the proposed development as having masonry/ 
concrete lift shaft, fire-isolated stair shaft and fire-isolated passage way; steel/concrete composite 
floor; protected steel structure frame; metal deck/concrete roof; glazed curtain walls; and 
steel/concrete open stair (level 3 – to 6). 
The building is served by two (2) fire isolated stairs located at the far North East and West ends of the 
building. Two (2) passenger lifts are located within the ground floor lobby situated on the North-West 
side of the proposed building, the lifts for functional purposes service the building from the Basement 
Carpark to level six (6). 
The floor area of the basement (carpark), Level 1 (shops) and Level 2 (office) are ~1800 m2 each. Their 
ceiling heights are 2.7 m, 3.9 m and 2.7 m, respectively. Level 2-6 have interconnected office space 
with a total floor area of ~7200 m2  and each of these Levels has 2.7 m height. At the roof, there is a 
plant room with a floor area of ~222 m2  and 3.1 m height. Therefore the effective height of the building 
is ~20.2 m (measured as per clause A1.1 of the BCA). 
4 Dominant Occupant Characteristics  
4.1 Number of Occupants 
Building occupancy numbers have been determined from a mixture of sources, namely; clause D1.13, 
Table D1.13 of the BCA and utilisation of occupant densities from the Fire Code Reform Centre (FCRC) 
Project 6 [32]. The occupant densities for shops as per [32] are half the densities than that of the BCA 
Deemed-to-Satisfy (DtS) requirements. The reduced densities are based on statistical research data 
collected by the Project 6 research development team given typical normal shopping periods. 
Occupant numbers denoted below in table 1 have been confirmed by the project stakeholders. 
Table 1 – Building Population 
Level  BCA 
Class 
Floor Area Floor Area excluding 
Lobby, Stair, and 
Amenity Areas 
Population Density MIPs Occupant 
Number 
Basement 7a ~1800 m2 N/A 30m2 per person 2 60 
Level 1 (Ground) 6 ~1800 m2 N/A 6m2 per person [32] 6 300 
Level 2 5 ~1800 m2 1385m2 10m2 per person 6 139 
Level 3  5 ~1800 m2 1385m2 10m2 per person 6 139 
Level 4 5 ~1800 m2 1385m2 10m2 per person 6 139 
Level 5 5 ~1800 m2 1385m2 10m2 per person 6 139 
Level 6 5 ~1800 m2 1385m2 10m2 per person 6 139 
Plant 5 ~222 m2 N/A 30m2 per person N/A 8 
Total 38 1063 
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4.2 State of Occupants 
Occupants within the Basement Carpark are expected to be awake, alert and familiar with the building, 
as access to the carpark is for building tenants only. The occupants within the basement carpark will 
be aware of the locations of alternative exits.  
Occupants within the level one 1 (Ground) floor shops are expected to be transient, awake and not 
familiar with the building (exception for staff), however the occupants will be familiar with the route 
that they have entered the shop/building and as such further consideration is to be made in order to 
facilitate safe egress from each shop. 
Occupants within the building office floor levels (2-6) can be categorized into two types of occupant 
groups, namely office/tenant staff which are expected to be awake, alert and familiar with the 
building, as access to the office is for building tenants only (i.e. security lift card swipe pass).  The 
second group of occupants expected within the office floor levels is visitors to the building and these 
occupants are expected to be unfamiliar with the building and the respective egress layouts. Within 
the office levels, unlike the Level 1 (Ground) floor shops, occupants are expected to be escorted at all 
times by office staff, and in the event of an emergency, it is anticipated that the visitors will be directed 
by office staff to evacuate via the most direct building exit. 
We also assume that 97% are ambulant and 3% are mobility impaired persons (MIP).  Statistics from 
the Australian Bureau of Statistics (ABS) have been used to establish a benchmark for the number of 
people who are disabled and MIP. According to the ABS 18% of Australians have some form of 
disability with 2.9 % of Australians always requiring assistance with regards to mobility, 
communication and care [33]. A figure of 3% has been used to discern the number of disabled and 
MIP occupants located on each level of the building. This figure is considered a conservative 
assumption due to the wide range of disabilities included within this percentage such as those who 
are bedridden and hence unlikely to be an occupant of this building.   
4.3 Emergency Management Training 
As part of the building fire safety system a building emergency management strategy is to be 
developed, which in turn will provide the building owners/managers with a means of training the 
individual shop/office employees and employers of the actions necessary upon activation of the 
building occupant warning system. 
5 Hazards Analysis and Safety Measures 
5.1 Mobility Impaired Occupants 
The primary hazards relevant to Mobility Impaired Personnel (MIP) in terms of the building fire safety 
strategy are (1) MIP’s are not able to evacuate using stairs, (2) the travel speed for MIP’s is likely to 
slower than compared to able-bodied occupants, and (3) MIP’s are more sensitive to how well-
maintained paths of travel are to exits. The fire safety strategy is therefore likely to include (1) reduced 
pre-movement time by requiring staff to alert evacuating MIP’s upon first knock of the smoke 
detection system, (2) the use of lifts for the evacuation of MIP’s, and (3) the use of lobbies on Levels 
2 to 6 for the MIPs to the benefit of MIP’s and intervening fire brigade in the event of a fire. 
5.2 Car Park 
Relatively little is reported in terms of injuries or fatalities to occupants and fire brigade from fires in 
car parks. Fires in car parking areas of residential buildings account for approximately 2% of fires (New 
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South Wales Fire Brigade [34-38]). No fatalities were reported as a result of fires in car parks under 
statistics obtained from the New Zealand Fire Service [NZFS] between 1999 and 2004 [39]. 
The possible fire scenarios for the basement include a vehicle either parked or whilst in motion. 
However due to the relatively open layout of the car park, it is reasonable to assume that occupants 
could rely on either visual, audible or olfactory cues to detect a fire. The risk to occupants of the 
building is likely to be offset through the provision of the trial design in Table 2. 
5.3 Retail Areas 
Retail areas are generally well defined in terms of layout however can represent a high fuel load. 
Therefore, the risk to occupants is primarily due to awareness (if occupants are under the influence of 
alcohol or are otherwise engaged in another activity), potentially fast-growing fires that has a high 
soot content and paths of egress that often have only one choice of direction available. The risk to 
occupants and fire brigade from fires in retail areas is likely to be offset by the provision of the trial 
design in Table 2. 
Table 2 –Trial Design Features 
Fire Safety System Extent of trial design 
Egress All exit doors are required to be outward swinging exit doors. 
The retail tenancies on the Ground Floor are required to be served with individual 
exits with a minimum width of 1.7 m each (i.e. Double doors). Two of these exits are 
required to open into the pedestrian path to the east. These exits are required to be 
separated at least 6 m apart. 
Exit doors separating the office areas from the adjacent amenities lobby on Levels 2 
to 6 are required as shown in Figure 3c and 3d. 
Protected lobby 
construction 
Lobbies with protected construction are required as shown in Figure 3. 
The glazed lobby walls are to consist of 6 mm toughened glass. 
Glazed lobby walls are to be protected with Tyco WS Specific Application Window 
Sprinkler Heads to achieve an FRL -/120/120. 
Doors within the lobby wall are to be fitted with smoke seals.  
Fire rated 
construction 
The lifts are required to be fire separated with FRL (60)/60/60. The switch room is 
required to be fire separated with FRL (60)/60/60 walls and a self-closing FRL -/60/60 
self-closing door. This is shown in Figure 3. 
The ground floor lobby is to be separated from the rest of ground floor (i.e. tenancy 
shops) with fire rated construction achieving a FRL of 60 minutes. 
Smoke detection 
system 
The building is required to be provided with an AS1670.1 compliant detection 
system. 
Sprinkler system The building is required to be sprinkler protected in accordance with AS2118.1. 
Occupant warning 
system 
The building is required to be provided with an occupant warning system in 
accordance with AS 1670.1. 
Visual warning indicators are to be provided throughout to provide additional 
assistance for people who may have hearing impairments. 
Manual call points are required on Levels 2-6 inclusive (to AS1670.1) 
Smoke hazard 
management 
The skylight above the roof is required to automatically open when a fire is detected 
in the building. 
The louvers on the façade on the second floor are required to open automatically 
when a fire is detected in the building. The size, shape and extent of automatically 
openable louvers will be the outcome of a performance-based assessment. 
Lifts for evacuation Lifts are to be used for egress purposes for people with MIP.  
Management in use An evacuation management strategy is to be developed and implemented in 
accordance with AS3745-2010. 
Fire hydrants A compliant fire hydrant system is required. 
Fire hose reels A compliant fire hose reel system is required.  
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5.4 Travel distances 
The hazard with an extended travel distance to an alternative exit is that in case of a fire blocking one 
exit, occupants will have to walk a longer distance to the alternative exit in conditions that may be 
hazardous due to the fire. The risk to occupants and fire brigade due to an extended distance of travel 
is likely to be offset by the provisions of the trial design in Table 2. 
5.5 Open Stair Interconnecting Four Levels 
The risks to occupants from a stair interconnecting more than one fire compartment are (1) an 
increased risk to occupant and fire brigade due to smoke and fire spread and (2) potentially increased 
fire size and burning duration.  
The hazards are likely to be offset by the provisions in the trial design shown in Table 2. 
6 Fire Safety Systems Design for Evaluation 
6.1 Fire Safety Strategy 
The strategy adopted was to develop a design that was independent of FBI, rather relies on passive 
and active fire safety measures. The aim of the strategy is to add fire safety systems in a layered 
approach until the risk to occupants in the building due to a fire in the same is less than that defined 
in the acceptance criteria. This approach has the benefits of (1) the interrelationship between different 
sub-systems can be tested and understood and (2) a quantifiably proven method can be used and 
therefore any unnecessary subsystems can be removed due to either (a) not having provided a 
worthwhile safety benefit and having little effect on the ERL; or (b) not being required to achieve an 
acceptable ERL. 
6.2 Trial designs 
Two trial designs were initially investigated to address the fire safety issues discussed in previous 
sections with a number of key design features and management strategies. These are underpinned by 
their main differentiating design feature: Option 1 - No Sprinklers; and Option 2 – Sprinklers. Both 
designs incorporate varying levels of fire protected compartments, smoke management solutions, 
protected construction, building management strategies as well as a combination of smoke isolated 
refuges and lifts for evacuation. 
After close consideration of the fire safety issues and client objectives, one trial design was formulated 
for further development, trial and evaluation.  The trial design detailed in Table 2 is an evolution of 
the two options considered above. The trial design is a mix of items that are required by the BCA DtS 
provisions and those that are required for a performance based design. It must be noted that all 
requirements given below will ultimately be due to the requirement arising from a performance based 
assessment. 
Circulation corridors were assumed to be located to the north of the floor plan on Level 2-6. This is on 
the basis that these corridors would lead to shared amenities such as toilets and therefore result in a 
design that was efficient in terms of useable area. These corridors were therefore also chosen for the 
location of refuges for the mobility impaired. Lobbies were sized based on guidance from AS1428.1-
2009 [40] which calls for (1) Unisex disabled toilets at 2300 mm deep minimum; and (2) Minimum 
corridor width 1000mm with 1800mm wide passing bays every 20 m. Therefore, approximate lobby 
width is 2.3 + 1.8 = 4.1 m. 
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Following the quantitative analysis, the trial design features were subjected to a trade-off analysis to 
determine the effectiveness of each feature and to determine those required to achieve an acceptable 
ERL. 
7 Assumptions 
The following assumptions have been made in this analysis 
1. Smouldering fires would not result in occupant fatalities as there is plenty of ventilation 
available in this building;  
2. Fires less than 1m2 in floor area would not result in conditions becoming untenable for 
occupants. It is considered that for fires less than 1m2 (i.e. confined to object of origin) for this 
occupancy type, unless someone is intimately involved with the fire, it would not cause any 
fatality. 
3. Corridor is assumed to be on the North  
4. Due to the open plan nature of the building spaces, in most cases, fires will be well ventilated 
and mostly fuel controlled.  It is acknowledged that these conditions may change as the fire 
grows, however the time taken to reach such a point is considered well beyond the time taken 
to reach untenable conditions.   
5. Although the building may operate on the weekend, all fire scenarios take place on weekdays 
as this will be when the level of activity in the building is at its highest.  
6. Due to the relatively low rise in storeys, stack effects are considered negligible and were not 
be incorporated into the analysis.   
7. It is assumed that dampers will close as necessary in the event of a fire to limit smoke spread. 
8. The required fire resistance levels of protected steel structure and Bondek1 slabs for the fire 
compartments that are served with a sprinkler system have been separately determined.  
9. The efficacy of the sprinkler system is taken into account by considering the following modes 
of sprinkler activation: 
a. The fire being controlled in size by the first activated sprinkler head; 
b. The fire being controlled after activation of the fourth sprinkler head; and 
c. Sprinkler failing to activate and therefore failing to limit the size of a fire. 
10. The efficacy of the smoke detection and occupant warning system are taken into 
consideration  with the following modes of operation: 
a. A fire being detected by an automatic fire detection system and therefore resulting in the 
occupant warning system being sounded. 
b. The automatic fire detection system failing and therefore occupants are relying on visual, 
audible or olfactory cues. 
c. Occupants activating the occupant warning system by pressing manual call points. 
8 Risk Model 
8.1 Event Tree Analysis 
Separate event trees were constructed for fires starting in the (1) car park; (2) retail areas; (3) Level 2; 
and (4) Level 3-6. The event trees included the impact of both working and failing of fire safety systems 
(1) Natural smoke ventilation/control system; (2) Fire rated lobbies (glazing and drenchers); (3) 
Automatic smoke detection and occupant warning system; (4) Sprinklers; (5) Lifts; and  
                                                          
1 A sheet metal product  which can be laid as the formwork as well as to serve as an integral part of the structural 
component. The use of it reduces the concrete slab thickness requirement. 
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(a) Fire location for Scenario 4 (Car Park) 
 
(b)  Plan view of fire locations for Scenario 1 (Ground Level Retail) 
 
(c) Fire locations for Scenario 2 (Level 2 Offices) 
 
(d) Fire locations for Scenario 3 (Openly Connected Office Levels) 
Figure 3. Floor Plans for various levels and fire locations for various scenario 
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3c 
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Figure 4 – Section A-A Showing Fire Compartments 
(6) Management Strategy (for staged evacuation). The event trees were constructed with events 
occurring in a chronological order. As an example, the sequence of events was included in the event 
tree for Level 3-6 is Fire Ignition Smouldering or flaming firesFire size less than or greater than 
1m2 in floor area Fire located in Location A (near stair), B (near far corner of the office) or C (in the 
office area near the lifts) Sprinklers working or failingAutomatic smoke detection and occupant 
warning system working or failingNatural smoke ventilation system working or failing 
Management Strategy working or not  Drenches to lobby glazing working or failingLobby glazing 
achieving the prescribed rating or notLifts working or failing. 
This initially resulted in an event tree with in excess of 1,000 possible combinations of sub-systems 
working and/or failing. The size of the event tree however was significantly reduced due to the 
assumptions outlined in Section 7. The final event tree representing all scenarios is detailed in Section 
9.1. The number of consequences for each of the remaining branches has been determined using 
ASET-RSET verification. Uncertainties have been taken into consideration for the ASET/RSET analysis 
by choosing either 80th of 90th percentile values for input parameters, using credible data sources 
and making conservative assumptions where required. 
8.2 Acceptance criteria 
As mentioned in Sections 2 and 6, the acceptance criteria is that the calculated value of risk will be 
less than the defined ERL Benchmark. The benchmark of acceptable risk to life with respect to fire was 
based on the principle of being equal to or better than current industry standards.  Current industry 
standards are considered to include those buildings meeting the DtS provisions of the BCA and those 
with approved alternative solutions.  Both types of buildings have demonstrated compliance with the 
performance requirements of the BCA and hence are deemed to pose an acceptable level of risk to 
life from fire. Based on this premise, the acceptable level of risk to life from fire posed by a building in 
Australia can be quantified by the number of deaths per 1000 fires for the applicable occupancy. 
A comparison of NSW FB data and Australia-wide data in Dryne [41] shows that NSW provides a close 
representation of Australia in terms of fire statistics.  The number of deaths per 1000 fires for the 
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‘Shop Store Office’ occupancy is 1.36. The ERL benchmark for the Office Building development is based 
on 1.36 deaths/1000 fires or a probability of death from the fire of 1.36 x 10-3.   
In section 2, the steps to calculate the ERL are presented. At each branch of the event tree, the 
scenario has a probability (Figure 1b) and a design fire. To calculate the consequence of each possible 
outcome, the number of occupants in breach of the defined tenability limits is quantified as shown in 
Section 8.4. 
8.3 Tenability Limits 
The tenability criteria is as follows: occupants can make their way through the relatively clear air below 
the hot smoke layer; and the smoke layer is maintained above any openings between compartments, 
thus minimising the risk that smoke will migrate to other areas. The acceptance criteria with regard to 
enclosure tenability for occupant evacuation shall be as  (1) when the smoke layer is above 2.1m, the 
smoke temperature is to be less than 200 °C (relating to an approximate heat flux on the floor of 2.5 
kW/m2) [42, 43], (2) When the smoke layer is below 2.1m, the tenability limit for smoke temperature 
is to be determined using the radiation heat flux  intensity and tolerance time criteria stated in the 
SFPE Handbook, 3rd Edition, Table 2-6.19 [44]  (a) <2.5 kW/m2  >5min (b) 2.5 kW/m2  30 sec (c) <2.5 
kW/m2 4 sec. (3) Visibility through the smoke layer is to be greater than 10 m in large open spaces and 
greater than 5 m for small enclosures / spaces. Where smoke layers deepens locally around any 
enclosing / bounding walls near exits, the application of 5m in these parts has been adopted in 
conjunction with the smoke layer temperature.  (4) a Fractional Effective Dose (FED) of Carbon 
Monoxide (CO) is to be less than 0.3 [43].  
The Metropolitan Fire & Emergency Services Board Guideline-17 [45] has been taken as a guide for 
the exposure limits for the fire brigade: (1) Routine conditions 25 min in maximum air temperature of 
100oC (lower layer) and 1 kW/m2 radiation heat flux; (2)  Hazardous conditions: 10 min in maximum 
air temperature of 120oC (lower layer) and 3 kW/m2 radiation heat flux; (3) Extreme conditions: 1 min 
in maximum air temperature of 160oC (lower layer), 280oC (upper layer)  and 4-4.5 kW/m2 radiation 
heat flux; (4) Critical conditions (not expected to operate, but may encounter): <1 min in maximum air 
temperature of >235oC (lower layer), 280oC (upper layer)  and 10 kW/m2 radiation heat flux. 
  
(a) FDS Temperature Contour at t=520s (b) Pathfinder Simulation showing Occupant 
position at t=520s 
Figure 4. Fire model and evacuation model results 
8.4 Determination of consequence 
Each fire scenario is modelled with a fire model (with the design fire as an input) and an evacuation 
model. An example is shown in the below screen captures from CFD-based fire model Fire Dynamics 
Simulator (FDS)[46] (Figure 4a) and evacuation model, Pathfinder [47] (Figure 4b). FDS model was 
developed by National Institute of Standard and Technology (NIST) and is being used by both 
researchers [27, 48, 49] and fire safety engineers.  Pathfinder can be used to calculate occupant 
movement time of occupants in a building and it has also been used by researchers [50] and fire safety 
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engineers alike. The movement time of occupants has been calculated using Nelson and Mowrer 
method given in the SFPE handbook [51]. The results from the fire simulation and evacuation 
modelling were integrated to determine exposure of occupants to untenable conditions. Figure 4(a) 
shows the onset of untenable conditions (T=180°C) for one of the FDS simulations at t = 520 seconds. 
Figure 4(b) shows the location of occupants at the same time in the Pathfinder evacuation model. 
FDS results show when and where tenability limits have been breached, and evacuation simulation 
results show how many occupants were exposed to untenable conditions from that time and 
therefore the number of casualties for a given scenario and consequence. This essentially an 
ASET/RSET analysis. A factor of safety of 1 was be applied to each ASET/RSET analysis. This is justified 
on the basis that the event-tree based approach quantifies the risk of occupants due to fire safety 
systems working and then separately when they have failed. Therefore, the event tree based approach 
intrinsically takes into account the risk to occupants from various fire safety systems either working 
as intended or failing to operate. Input data for ASET/RSET analysis took either the 80th of 90th 
percentile values (as appropriate) instead of mean values. 
8.5 Trade-off tool 
The overall ERL result is shown in Table 3. This table shows the QRPA trade-off tool which was 
developed to analyse the effectiveness of the trial design features in mitigating the risk to life. The 
tool was used to determine the preferred solution and its associated ERL based on the simulation 
results, and underpinned by statistical data.  
Table 3 – Trade-off tool developed to assess trial design features with respect to ERL 
 
9 Design Fire Scenarios and Modelling Results 
9.1 Potential Fire Scenarios 
As shown in Figure 1(a), data for ignition location and probability was collected. According to data 
included in the NSW Fire Brigades Annual Statistical Reports (ASR) [34-38], the most common areas 
Sector System Component On/Off ERL
Sprinklers On
Smoke Detection On
Smoke Control On
Glazing On
Drenchers On
Lifts On
Sprinklers On
Smoke Detection On
Smoke Control On
Glazing On
Drenchers On
Lifts On
Sprinklers On
Smoke Detection On
Smoke Control On
Glazing On
Drenchers On
Lifts On
Sprinklers On
Smoke Detection On
Smoke Control On
Glazing On
Drenchers On
Lifts On
Building Total ERL
0.001014607Levels 3-6 (Openly Connected Office)
0.001014751
Level 2 (Office)
Level 1 (Retail)
Basement (Carpark)
1.44358E-07
0
0
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Table 4 Credible Fire Scenarios 
Storey of Fire Origin Area of Fire Origin Fire Type Fire Size Prob. 
Relative 
Likelihood 
Consequence Comment Risk Score 
Open Office Levels 3-6 Kitchen, cooking area Flaming >1m2 16.80% Frequent Catastrophic 
Potential spread of smoke and flame to all 4 floors via open stair, 
potential for wide spread damage and multiple deaths. 
20 
Ground Level Retail Kitchen, cooking area Flaming >1m2 16.80% Frequent Catastrophic 
High population of people, but multiple egress routes, death possible for 
those close to the fire. 
20 
Ground Level Retail 
Storage areas (including 
garage and vehicle storage) 
Flaming >1m2 15.30% Frequent Catastrophic 
High population of people, but multiple egress routes. High/dense fuel 
load, potential for death and serious injury. 
20 
Office Level 2 Kitchen, cooking area Flaming >1m2 16.80% Frequent Severe 
Moderate population, potential for major property damage but death is 
unlikely. 
15 
Basement Carpark 
Storage areas (including 
garage and vehicle storage) 
Flaming >1m2 15.30% Frequent Severe 
Low population, potential for major property loss, however deaths 
unlikely 
15 
Open Office Levels 3-6 Office Flaming >1m2 6.72% Occasional Catastrophic 
Potential spread of smoke and flame to all 4 floors via open stair, 
potential for wide spread damage and multiple deaths. 
12 
All levels All locations Flaming <1m2 - Frequent Major 
Flaming fires of <1m2 have the potential to cause only minor damage 
and serious injuries, but are unlikely to cause death. 
10 
Office Level 2 
Means of egress 
(hallway/mall and lobby) 
Flaming >1m2 7.08% Occasional Severe 
Level 2 is within its own compartment, one stair to be used for 
evacuation on this level, but other floors unlikely to be impeded. 
Potential for major property loss, deaths unlikely. 
9 
Ground Level Retail 
Means of egress 
(hallway/mall and lobby) 
Flaming >1m2 7.08% Remote Catastrophic 
Creates a hazard to all those using the west side stair. Lifts unable to be 
used for evacuation, evacuation of all other floors at risk and likely to 
take much longer. All lobbies, lifts and refuges will be sterile and 
probability of fire start is unlikely.   
8 
Open Office Levels 3-6 
Means of egress 
(hallway/mall and lobby) 
Flaming >1m2 7.08% Remote Catastrophic 
Potential spread of smoke and flame to all 4 floors via open stair. All 
lobbies, lifts and refuges will be sterile and probability of fire start is 
unlikely.  Potential for wide spread damage and multiple deaths. 
8 
Roof Service, equipment areas Flash over >1m2 7.81% Occasional Major 
Fire isolated service room on roof, loss of expensive plant and 
equipment is likely, injury or death is unlikely. 
6 
All levels Service, equipment areas Flash over >1m2 7.81% Occasional Major 
Fire isolated service room on roof, loss of expensive plant and 
equipment is likely, injury or death is unlikely. 
6 
Basement Carpark 
Means of egress 
(hallway/mall and lobby) 
Flaming >1m2 7.08% Occasional Major 
Low population, potential for major property loss, smoke lobby is not 
the primary means of evacuation in the basement car park, deaths 
unlikely 
6 
Office Level 2 Office Flaming >1m2 6.72% Occasional Major 
Moderate population, potential for major property damage but death is 
unlikely. 
6 
All levels All locations Smouldering <1m2 - Frequent Minor 
Smouldering fires are unlikely to cause any injury and only minor 
damage. 
5 
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for fires to start in office and retail buildings are kitchen, cooking area (16.80%); storage areas 
(including garage and vehicle storage) (15.30%); Sales, show-room area (10.44%); Service, equipment 
areas (7.81%); Means of egress (hallway/mall and lobby) (7.08%); and Office (6.72%). The same data 
set indicates the most common causes of fire start are Incendiary and suspicious (20.88%); Short-
circuit and other electrical failure (17.34%); Unattended heat sources (5.22%); and Abandoned, 
discarded material (4.04%). The majority of fires are smouldering fires with 55% falling into this 
category [52].  The remaining 45% are flaming, of which 51.2% are less than one square metre in size 
(BSI PD-7974 2003, Table A.6, [53]). 
Based on this data and the layout of the building, the fire scenarios posing a credible risk are 
summarised in Table 4.  A high-level qualitative risk analysis was conducted to identify these specific 
scenarios to be tested against the trial designs.  The level of risk associated with the risk score and the 
applicable action are (a) red (extreme): Requires quantitative analysis (score 16-20); (b) yellow (high): 
Requires quantitative analysis (score 12-15); (c) blue (medium): considered only if unique to other 
fires in higher risk categories (score 7-11); and green (low): insignificant, no further analysis required 
(score 1-6) [54]. In Table 4, risk scores are allocated based on engineering judgement. 
Table 5 – Design Fire Scenarios for Analysis 
# Descripti
on 
Time 
of 
Day 
Day Occupa
nt 
State 
Ignition 
Source 
Fuel Load Design 
Fires 
Location 
of Fire 
Ventilation 
Conditions 
HVAC 
Type Density 
(MJ/m2) 
1 Level 1, 
kitchen, 
cooking 
area or 
storage 
area 
1300 Wee
kday 
Awake, 
alert 
Electrical 
fault, 
unattended 
heat source, 
abandoned/
discarded 
material 
Shops 1100 4, 5, 6 Café area 
of retail 
tenancies, 
storage 
area 
Well 
ventilated, 
fuel 
controlled 
Damper
s closed 
2 Level 2, 
office 
and 
kitchen, 
cooking 
area 
1300 Wee
kday 
Awake, 
alert 
Electrical 
fault, 
unattended 
heat source 
abandoned/
discarded 
material 
Office, 
business 
800 1, 2, 3 Desk or 
waste 
basket, 
communal 
kitchen 
Well 
ventilated, 
fuel 
controlled 
Damper
s closed 
3 Level 3, 
office 
and 
kitchen, 
cooking 
area 
1500 Wee
kday 
Awake, 
alert 
Electrical 
fault, 
unattended 
heat source 
abandoned/
discarded 
material 
Office, 
business 
800 1, 2, 3 Desk or 
waste 
basket, 
communal 
kitchen 
Well 
ventilated, 
fuel 
controlled 
Damper
s closed 
4 Basemen
t 
Carpark, 
storage 
area 
1700 Wee
kday 
Awake, 
alert 
Electrical 
fault, 
abandoned/
discarded 
material 
Undergr
ound 
garage, 
private 
200 7, 8, 9 Garage 
storage 
area 
Well 
ventilated, 
fuel 
controlled 
Damper
s closed 
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55.0% 55.0%
0 0
Chance
0.001008137
51.2% 23.04%
0 0
45.0% Chance
0 0.002240306
48.8% Chance
0 0.00459079
95.0%
33.3333% Chance
0 0.003159389
5.0%
95.0%
33.3333% Chance
0 0.008837489
5.0%
95.0%
33.3333% Chance
0 0.001775493
5.0%
Fire Ignition
Smouldering
Flaming
Fire size <1m2
Fire Size >1m2
Location A (Near Stair)
Sprinklers Fail
Sprinklers Operate
Location B (Corner)
Sprinklers Operate
Sprinklers Fail
Location C (Blocking Lift Lobby)
Sprinklers Operate
Sprinklers Fail
90.0%
0
64.55% Chance
0 0
10.0%
0
Chance
0
90.0%
0
35.45% Chance
0 0
10.0%
0
Sprinklers Control Fire Early
Automatic Smoke Detection Fails
Automatic Smoke Detection Operates
Sprinklers Control Fire Late
Automatic Smoke Detection Operates
Automatic Smoke Detection Fails
A 
B 
B 
B 
A 
A 
A 
C 
C 
C 
C 
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Figure 5 – Office Building Fire Scenario Event Tree 
90.0%
0
Chance
0.025920675
4.0%
0
10.0% Chance
0 0.259206752
96.0%
0
Automatic Smoke Detection Fails
Manual Detected at Ignition
Manually Detected 5min/<10m Vis
Automatic Smoke Detection Operates
85.0%
0
90.0% Chance
0 0
15.0%
0
Chance
7.88839E-07
85.0%
0
10.0% Chance
0 7.88839E-06
15.0%
0
Smoke Control System Operates
Management Strategy Operates
Management Strategy Fails
Smoke Control System Fails
Management Strategy Operates
Management Strategy Fails
95.0%
0
Chance
0
40.0%
0
5.0% Chance
0 0
98.6804%
0
60.0% Chance
0 0
1.3152%
0
0.0044%
0
Drencher Operates
Drencher Fails
Glazing Acheives Rating
Glazing Fails
Both Lifts Operate
One Lift Operates
Both Lifts Fail
B 
C 
C 
C 
D 
C 
D 
D 
D 
D 
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Table 6 Event Tree Data and Assumptions 
Probabilities – Office Building Event Tree  
Component Description Value Reference Comment 
Probability of Fire Start Based on data from the London Fire Brigade’s Real Fire Library. 0.0017 Holborn et al. 2002, Table 12 
[55]Error! Reference source 
not found. 
The data used has been collected from the mid-1990s and is more applicable than other sources which utilise fire statistics dating back to 
the 1960s (e.g. North 1973).  The main cause of fire in office buildings during that period was careless action with a naked flame (mainly 
smokers’ materials) which is not applicable to office buildings in Australia today. 
Probability of Flaming Probability that the fire will be flaming. 0.45 Hall 2010 [52] Based on statistical data. 
Probability of fire size 
<1m2 
Based on the number of fires of this size in office buildings without sprinklers. 0.512 BSI PD-7974 2003, Table A.6 
[53] 
Using data from office buildings without sprinklers accounts for those fires which start, but do not go on to develop into serious fires 
whether through self-extinguishment or otherwise (i.e. not through automatic suppression). 
Sprinklers Reliability of sprinkler system operation in response to flaming fires 0.95 Moinuddin and Thomas [56] Australian data is most relevant.  Moinuddin and Thomas [56] from fault tree analysis shows that the reliability of the sprinkler system in 
Australian high-rise building lies in between 89% and 98% when isolation valves are installed for each storey. The local fire brigade data 
shows ~95.5% reliability. 
Sprinklers Early Probability that one sprinkler head will bring the fire under control (achieving suppression 
earlier). 
0.6455 HB-147, Table 6.3 [57] Based on the percentage of fires brought under control by one sprinkler head. 
Sprinklers Late Probability that four sprinkler heads will bring the fire under control (achieving suppression 
later). 
0.3545 HB-147, Table 6.3 [57] Based on the percentage of fires brought under control by four or more sprinkler heads. 
Automatic Smoke 
Detection 
Reliability of commercial smoke detectors. 0.9 BSI PD -7974 2003, Table A.17 
[53]  
Most applicable data source.  Many smoke detector reliability values include low grade and domestic (e.g. battery operated) smoke 
detectors.  A commercial grade system is most representative of the system to be specified for this building. 
Smoke Control System Probability of smoke control system (automatic and manual) operating as designed 0.9 BSI PD-7974 2003, Table A.17 
[53] 
Most conservative of all credible data sources 
Manual Detection Based on the percentage of office fires discovered by occupants at ignition or in under 5 minutes 0.48 Holborn et al. 2004, Table 12 
Error! Reference source not 
found.[58] 
Relevant to occupancy and building type, is the most conservative of all credible data sources) 
Lift Reliability Reliability of lifts, minus the reliability impact of the fire itself. 0.99338 Sharma 2008, Chapter 6 [59] Sharma 2008 references reliability of lifts from other studies and calculates additional reduction of reliability due to factors caused by fires 
(through Fault Tree Analysis).. 
Drencher Reliability Reliability of the drencher system (in parallel and separate to sprinkler system). 0.95 Moinuddin and Thomas [56] Australian data is most relevant.  Moinuddin and Thomas [56] from fault tree analysis shows that the reliability of the sprinkler system in 
Australian high-rise building lies in between 89% and 98% when isolation valves are installed for each storey. The local fire brigade data 
shows ~95.5% reliability. 
Glazing Reliability Probability that fire resisting structures (Glazing), will achieve at least 75% of the designated fire 
resistance standard 
0.4 PD7974, Table A.17 [53] Highly conservative value, given that in the majority of scenarios even achieving 30% of the rated value would be sufficient to provide 
protection to occupants. 
Pr(Fire in Location A) Probability that the fire is located near the stair. 0.33333 N/A Given that the location of kitchens, office/retail areas, storage areas, etc. within the specified floor spaces is undefined, there is equal 
probability of the fire being anywhere outside of the designated lobby area. 
Pr(Fire in Location B) Probability that the fire is located in the far corner of the building. 0.33333 N/A Given that the location of kitchens, office/retail areas, storage areas, etc. within the specified floor spaces is undefined, there is equal 
probability of the fire being anywhere outside of the designated lobby area. 
Pr(Fire in Location C) Probability that the fire is located near the lobby door leading to the lifts and western fire 
isolated exit. 
0.33333 N/A Given that the location of kitchens, office/retail areas, storage areas, etc. within the specified floor spaces is undefined, there is equal 
probability of the fire being anywhere outside of the designated lobby area. 
Management Strategy Reliability of the management strategy for staged evacuation on the openly connected office 
floors fails. Strategy is for all occupants not on the fire affected floor to move into the lobby and 
await further instruction - only the floor of fire origin evacuates through the fire isolated stair. 
0.85 N/A Conservative value chosen assuming 6 monthly (or more frequent) fire drills, fire warden system and robust induction program. 
Number of MIPs per 
floor 
The number of mobility impaired personnel on each floor. 6 N/A As agreed with the Authorities Having Jurisdiction (AHJ) 
Probabilities - Retail Fires Event Tree  
Component Description Value Reference Comment 
Probability of Fire Start Based on data from the London Fire Brigade’s Real Fire Library. 0.003 Holborn et al. 2002, Table 12 [55] The data used has been collected from the mid-1990s and is more applicable than other sources which utilise fire statistics dating back to the 
1960s (e.g. North 1973) 
Probability of fire size 
<1m2 
Based on the number of fires of this size in retail buildings without sprinklers, 'Other areas'. 0.435 BSI PD-7974 2003, Table A.6 [53] Using data from retail buildings without sprinklers accounts for those fires which start, but do not go on to develop into serious fires whether 
through self-extinguishment or otherwise (i.e. not through automatic suppression). 
Probabilities - Carpark Fires Event Tree 
Component Description Value Reference Comment 
Probability of Fire Start Based on data from the London Fire Brigade’s Real Fire Library. 0.003 Holborn et al. 2002, Table 12 [55] The data used has been collected from the mid-1990s and is more applicable than other sources which utilise fire statistics dating back to the 
1960s (e.g. North 1973) 
Probability of fire size 
<1m2 
Based on the number of fires of this size in retail buildings without sprinklers, 'Other areas'. 0.435 BSI PD-7974 2003, Table A.6 [53] Using data from retail buildings without sprinklers accounts for those fires which start, but do not go on to develop into serious fires whether 
through self-extinguishment or otherwise (i.e. not through automatic suppression). 
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All fire scenarios with a risk rating of significant or higher (score ≥ 12), as shown in Table 4, were taken 
forward for further for quantitative risk analysis and testing against the trial designs. The design fire 
scenarios for analysis have been consolidated into a total of four scenarios as detailed in Table 5.  Each 
scenario has three associated schematic design fires (one for each sprinkler suppression scenario and 
one for sprinklers fail).  Three types of corresponding fuel loads (as per IFEG 2005, [22]) are considered 
across the scenarios: Office, business; Shops; and Underground garage, private. This gives rise to a 
total of nine schematic design fires as detailed in Table A.1 in Appendix A.  
The main event tree has been split into a series of sub-event trees to aid documentation.  The event 
tree has been formulated to quantify the probability associated with each possible response from the 
fire safety system to the fire scenarios detailed in Table 5.  Smouldering fires and small flaming fires 
were discounted in the qualitative risk assessment and are not considered in the quantitative analysis.  
When further intervention from the fire safety system would have had no effect on the scenario 
outcomes, the event tree has been terminated. The event tree applicable to all office scenarios is 
shown in Figure 5. 
Fuel load is based on the dominant fuel load in the affected area for each scenario. Day and time of 
day for each scenario is based on worst case scenario occupancy populations (i.e. during peak times).  
Occupant state is based on the class of building and associated building use. As a measure of 
conservatism, intervention by occupants with fire extinguishers was ignored. 
Level 3 was selected as the floor of fire origin for the fire scenarios concerning the openly connected 
office spaces on the top four levels as this will result in the largest consequence.  This preliminary 
assumption effectively assumes the worst-case scenario for any fire starting on levels 3 to 6 which are 
connected by the open stair through which fire and smoke may spread.  Calculation of the ERL in this 
way is therefore inherently conservative. 
The probability values and data sources for the event trees are summarized in Table 6. 
9.2 Fire Locations and Design Fires 
Given that the layout of each floor will remain flexible throughout the life of the building, a number 
of different fire start locations were considered for each scenario as shown below.  With the exception 
of the service equipment areas, this approach inherently considers the remaining flaming fire 
scenarios that were discounted from further analysis by the risk assessment shown in  Table 4. 
The schematic design fire parameters did not vary with location; however, occupant response was 
varied and integrated into evacuation modelling as detailed in Section 10. The fire locations for each 
of the fire scenarios to be modelled and analysed are shown in Figure 2. 
9.3 Fire Modelling Results 
FDS was used to model the worst case scenario of a fire on Level 3 (this would affect a total of 4 levels) 
as shown in Figure 2(d) and the consequences from these scenarios effectively applied to other 
scenarios where fires occur on levels 4 to 6.  Grid size of 0.25 m was used. The FDS simulations also 
incorporated opening of the lobby doors at the latest detection time and closure when the last person 
enters the lobby.  By using the worst case times, this conservatively estimates worst case conditions 
reached inside the lobby for each simulation. These fire safety system responses were modelled for 
each fire location (1) Sprinklers control the fire early (with one active head); (2) Sprinklers control the 
fire late (with four active heads); (3) Sprinklers fail; (4) Smoke control system activates (skylight above 
open stair opens); and (5) Smoke control system fails. 
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Table 7 – Level 3 (Floor of Fire Origin) FDS Results 
Simulation /Scenario 
D
es
ig
n
 F
ir
e
 
Time Until Tenability Limit Reached (seconds) 
O
n
se
t 
o
f 
1
0
m
 v
is
ib
ili
ty
 o
n
 f
lo
o
r 
1
0
m
 a
cr
o
ss
 e
n
ti
re
 f
lo
o
r 
O
n
se
t 
o
f 
5
m
 v
is
ib
ili
ty
 o
n
 f
lo
o
r 
5
m
 a
cr
o
ss
 e
n
ti
re
 f
lo
o
r 
O
n
se
t 
o
f 
6
0
°C
 o
n
 f
lo
o
r 
6
0
°C
 a
cr
o
ss
 e
n
ti
re
 f
lo
o
r 
O
n
se
t 
o
f 
1
0
0
°C
 o
n
 f
lo
o
r 
1
0
0
°C
 a
cr
o
ss
 e
n
ti
re
 f
lo
o
r 
O
n
se
t 
o
f 
1
8
0
°C
 o
n
 f
lo
o
r 
O
n
se
t 
o
f 
1
8
0
°C
 o
n
 O
cc
u
p
an
ts
 
(E
as
t 
Si
d
e
) 
O
n
se
t 
o
f 
1
8
0
°C
 o
n
 O
cc
u
p
an
ts
 
(W
e
st
 S
id
e
/L
if
ts
) 
1
8
0
°C
 a
cr
o
ss
 e
n
ti
re
 f
lo
o
r 
A
SE
T 
(E
as
t 
Si
d
e
) 
A
SE
T 
(W
e
st
 S
id
e
/L
if
ts
) 
Fire Location A, Smoke Control System activates, all other systems fail 3 96 193 181 252 218 367 333 484 477 587 587 660 587 587 
Fire Location A, Sprinklers control fire early, all other systems fail 1 155 310 304 657 inf inf inf inf inf inf inf inf inf inf 
Fire Location A, Sprinklers control fire early, Smoke Control System 
activates, all other systems fail 
1 
155 310 304 657 inf inf inf inf inf inf inf inf inf inf 
Fire Location A, Sprinklers control fire late, all other systems fail 2 128 193 175 257 227 425 524 inf inf inf inf inf inf inf 
Fire Location A, Sprinklers control fire late, Smoke Control System activates, 
all other systems fail 
2 
97 200 178 254 234 424 538 inf inf inf inf inf inf inf 
Fire Location A, total failure – all systems fail 3 96 193 178 252 221 356 328 477 473 585 585 652 585 585 
Fire Location B, Smoke Control System activates, all other systems fail 3 110 221 137 257 216 380 328 488 466 520 520 697 520 520 
Fire Location B, Sprinklers control fire early, all other systems fail 1 112 304 230 743 inf inf inf inf inf inf inf inf inf inf 
Fire Location B, Sprinklers control fire early, Smoke Control System 
activates, all other systems fail 
1 
112 304 225 741 inf inf inf inf inf inf inf inf inf inf 
Fire Location B, Sprinklers control fire late, all other systems fail 2 111 221 137 254 212 463 440 inf inf 1280 1280 inf 1280 1280 
Fire Location B, Sprinklers control fire late, Smoke Control System activates, 
all other systems fail 
2 
111 221 139 254 212 461 475 inf inf 1230 1230 inf 1230 1230 
Fire Location B, total failure – all systems fail 3 111 221 137 257 212 380 326 488 464 520 520 693 520 520 
Fire Location C, Smoke Control System activates, all other systems fail 3 49 228 65 260 119 175 175 266 266 695 480 691 695 480 
Fire Location C, Sprinklers control fire early, all other systems fail 1 51 299 65 790 inf inf inf inf inf inf inf inf inf inf 
Fire Location C, Sprinklers control fire early, Smoke Control System 
activates, all other systems fail 
1 
51 297 65 796 inf inf inf inf inf inf inf inf inf inf 
Fire Location C, Sprinklers control fire late, all other systems fail 2 51 232 65 260 122 448 185 inf inf inf inf inf inf inf 
Fire Location C, Sprinklers control fire late, Smoke Control System activates, 
all other systems fail 
2 
51 232 65 260 124 450 185 inf inf inf inf inf inf inf 
Fire Location C, total failure – all systems fail 3 49 228 65 260 119 375 184 484 275 670 480 680 670 480 
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Each simulation was run for a total of 1800 seconds or 30 minutes, if a tenability limit was not reached 
by this time, the ASET was considered infinite for the purposes of the analysis. Make up air inlets for 
each floor were sized in accordance with CIBSE Guide E TM19 [42]. 
The FDS results for Level 3 are summarised in Table 7. There are similar results for Level 4-6 which are 
not presented due to the space constraints.  Some sample results of visibility and heat flux are 
presented in Figure 6. It can be noted that in all cases, visibility was not deemed to affect the tenability 
limit due to the familiarity of the occupants with the building and their location relative to the exits at 
the time visibility limits were reached.  In all cases, exposure to smoke temperatures of 180°C was the 
first tenability limit reached.  Although occupants are able to be exposed at this temperature for up 
to a minute, to retain conservatism in the calculation of ASET values, the time at which 180°C was 
reached in the location of occupants was noted as the tenability limit. 
   
(a) Visibility result (b) Heat flux result 
Figure 6. Contour plots from FDS simulation showing visibility and heat flux contours 
Branzfire [60], a two zone model, was used to model all fires occurring in the basement carpark, Level 
1 Retail and Level 2 Office. Similar to the FDS simulations, the relevant fire safety system responses 
were modelled (1) Sprinklers control the fire early (with one active head); (2) Sprinklers control the 
fire late (with four active heads); and (3) Sprinklers fail. The Branzfire simulation runs are summarised 
in Table 8.  Again, it can be noted that in all cases, visibility was not deemed to affect the tenability 
limit due to the familiarity of the occupants with the building and their location relative to the exits at 
the time visibility limits were reached.  In all cases, exposure to smoke temperatures of 180°C was the 
first tenability limit reached.  Although occupants are able to be exposed at this temperature for up 
to a minute, to retain conservatism in the calculation of ASET values, the time at which 180°C was 
reached in the location of occupants was noted as the tenability limit. 
Table 8. Branzfire results 
Scenario 
Design 
Fire 
Visibility <10m 
across entire 
floor 
180°C across 
entire floor FED CO ASET 
Lv 1 Retail - Sprinkler Early 4 180 1800 697 697 
Lv 1 Retail - Sprinkler Late 5 169 1800 486 486 
Lv 1 Retail - Sprinkler Fail 6 169 680 383 383 
Lv 2 Office - Sprinkler Early 1 509 1800 1433 1433 
Lv 2 Office - Sprinkler Late 2 420 1800 1101 1101 
Lv 2 Office - Sprinkler Fail 3 289 680 690 680 
Carpark – Sprinklers Early 7 634 infinite infinite infinite 
Carpark – Sprinklers Late 8 509 infinite infinite infinite 
Carpark – Sprinklers Fail 9 361 967 infinite 967 
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10 Evacuation Modelling 
10.1 Design Occupant Groups 
The IFEG [22] states that: “To avoid excessive complexity only the most critical, relevant or significant 
characteristics should be considered for a given group”. In order to avoid complexity, design occupant 
groups have been developed as (1) Staff and Public for Basement “Carpark” (2) Mixed occupants 
(Public/Staff) for Ground (Level 1) “Shop” (3)  Staff and Escorted Public  for Level 2 “Office” (4) Staff 
and Escorted Public for Level 3 – to 6 “Office”.  It is assumed that all occupants are awake, staff 
members are familiar with the building and trained, whilst the visitors/public are unfamiliar and 
untrained.  
It is possible that a greater number of disabled and MIP may congregate on one floor level than noted 
in the design occupancy populations. This scenario is to be considered as part of the buildings 
emergency management procedures. Occupants on the ground floor (level 1) retail/shop will consist 
of both people from the general public and shop/retail staff and therefore are expected to be 
unfamiliar/familiar with the buildings exits, egress layouts, and are most likely to exit via the door 
through which they entered [32]. Occupants on all other levels are expected to be familiar with the 
buildings exits and egress layouts, or be escorted (except car park) by someone who is familiar.  
10.2 RSET Calculation  
The RSET includes several time components; these components are described in Chapter 2.8 of the 
IFEG [22] and are articulated as Cue period (Tc), Response period (Tr), Delay period (Td), and Movement 
period (Tm). These components can combine to form evacuation phases and are articulated as 
Detection phase (Tc), Pre-movement phase (Tr + Td), Movement phase (Tm), and Evacuation phase (Tr 
+ Td + Tm). The RSET is then calculated by summing the following components/phases: 
𝑅𝑆𝐸𝑇 =  𝑇𝑐 + 𝑇𝑟 + 𝑇𝑑 + 𝑇𝑚 
10.3 Detection and pre-movement time (Tc, Tr)  
The calculation of the detection (phase) time, for automatic detection has been calculated by using 
Alpert correlation, taking into consideration the device type (i.e. smoke detector, sprinkler etc.), 
location and sensitivity. The calculation of the detection (phase) time, for manual detection has been 
derived on the basis of (1) At Ignition [58] OR (2) whichever occurs first of (a) 5 minutes after ignition 
[58]; or visibility at 2.1m reduced to 10 m. Values for pre-movement time for the given building usages 
are provided within table 4.5 of CIBSE Guide E [42]. Pre-movement times within the carpark are 
assumed to be similar in nature to the office levels due to having the same occupant design group 
characteristics, and hence a pre-movement time of 1 minute has been adopted. For retail/shop 
occupants it is considered 2 minutes.   
10.4 Movement Phase (Tm)  
 To calculate the movement time, references have been consulted in order to provide travel speeds 
for the varying occupants [42, 44]. The effective travel speed will be greatly dependent upon the 
slowest member of a group (the MIP occupants). Studies by the Fire SERT Research group at the 
University of Ulster as referenced by the SFPE Handbook [44] have provided movement speeds for 
MIP occupants.  
According to Jin [61] it can be expected that movement through smoke will affect the movement time 
of the occupants; however research conducted by Fridolf et al. [62] have quoted that “when the 
visibility is higher than 2.5 m, it may be argued that visibility does not affect the walking speed”. It has 
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therefore been assumed that the occupant walking speed will not be affected before untenable 
conditions develop, for example visibility less than 10 or 5 m respectively. 
Based on the above, the respective travel speeds proposed are 1.2 m/s for general public and 0.692 
m/s for MIP occupants for all design group. A review by Thompson and Marchant [63] has summarised 
flow rate data from several resources and presents flow rates between 1.3 and 1.83 persons/m/s with 
a mean of 1.44 persons/m/s. For the purposes of the fire engineering assessment a flow rate of 1.36 
persons/m/s was used (lower 95th percentile of [1.3, 1.44, 1.83]), however in accordance with the SFPE 
method, the flow speed through the door was dependent on the occupant density at the door. The 
buildings population numbers have been denoted in Section 4.1.  
The movement time was calculated through evacuation modelling by using Pathfinder rather than 
simpler hand calculations to better understand the impact of having several floors being evacuated 
simultaneously.  
The use of lifts as a means of evacuation has been considered as part of this study, for the purposes 
of the evacuation modelling it has been assumed that due to the implementation of the evacuation 
strategy all mobility impaired occupants will always evacuate via the lifts. This assumption is 
considered conservative given that if the use of lifts is compromised occupants may use the stairs with 
assistance of others. Evacuation modelling of occupants via lifts is proposed to follow the 
methodologies outlined by Klote and Milke [64] in their Appendix C.  
Table 9 – Calculated Building ERL 
 ERL for Initial Preferred Trial Design  Final Alternative Solution 
Sector System Component ERL System Component  
Levels 3-6 (Openly 
Connected Office) 
Al components of 
Table 3  
0.001014607 
Al components of 
Table 3 except 
smoke control 
0.001014604 
Level 2 (Office) 
Al components of 
Table 3 except smoke 
control 
1.44358E-07 
Al components of 
Table 3 except 
smoke control 
1.44358E-07 
Level 1 (Retail) 
 Only Sprinklers, Smoke 
Detection 
0 none 
0 
Basement (Carpark) 
Only Sprinklers, Smoke 
Detection, Lifts 
0 none 
0 
Building Total ERL 0.0010147512  0.0010147487 
Acceptance Criteria 0.0013  0.0013 
Building Total ERL / Acceptance Criteria 78.1%  78.1% 
11 ERL Results, Final Design and Discussion 
11.1 Occupant Life Safety – ERL 
The ERL of the building is first calculated, as described in Section 8, incorporating all design features 
in the trial designs is shown in Table 3 and presented there.  Note that Management Strategy was not 
included in further analysis, as it was deemed unnecessary.  Additionally, it is an objective of the fire 
safety strategy not to be reliant on fire brigade or management in use requirements. Then some 
features of Trial Design of Table 3 are switched off as shown in columns 2 & 3 of Table 9. This is initial 
                                                          
2 A movement speed of 0.69 m/s has been based on data supplied by the SERT Research Group for the mean 
manual wheelchair movement speed, SFPE Handbook Revision 3    
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preferred trial design. The results show that the calculated ERL is approximately 22% lower than the 
acceptable ERL. 
A trade-off analysis has been conducted to determine the effectiveness of the design features in the 
trial designs.  Event tree analysis has been used to determine the effect on the ERL when one or more 
of the design features is removed. Table 10 shows the factor of increase in ERL for the entire building 
if certain sub-systems were to be removed from specific areas of the building. 
Table 10– Effect of Sub-systems on Building ERL 
Sector Removed System Component Relative factor (multiple) of increase in ERL 
Levels 2,  3-6 (Openly 
Connected Office) 
Sprinklers 20 
Smoke Detection 4.2 
Smoke Control 0.0 
Toughened glazing 1.7 
Drenchers 20 
Lifts 2.2 
Level 1 (Retail) 
Sprinklers 0.0 
Smoke Detection 0.0 
Basement (Carpark) 
Sprinklers 0.0 
Smoke Detection 0.0 
Lifts 0.0 
Several different combinations have been investigated to determine the design features necessary to 
achieve an acceptable ERL.  The analysis shows that (1) Removing sprinklers and wall-wetting 
sprinklers from the trial design for Level 2, 3-6 will result in a 20-fold increase in the building wide ERL 
each, (2) Removing the smoke detection and occupant warning system from Level 2 and Level 3-6 will 
also result in the building wide ERL being increased by a factor of 4.2, (3) Removing lifts from Level 2, 
and 3-6 would result the building wide ERL being increased by a factor of 2.2 (4) Removing toughened 
glazing from the trial design for Level 2, 3-6 will result in a 1.7-fold increase in ERL. Therefore, the 
building solutions require all features which results in above 0 in Table 10 in order for the building-
wide ERL to be acceptable. 
The natural ventilation/smoke control system proposed for Level 3-6 was found to have minimal 
benefit to life safety and does not significantly change the ERL of the building. The same was found 
for sprinklers, automatic fire detection and occupant warning for the Basement Carpark and Level 1 
Retail. The analysis also shows that lifts are not required in the Basement Carpark as the net increase 
in risk was negligible. Therefore, these features as proposed in the trial design are not required.   
11.2 Required Fire Safety Measures 
The fire safety measures that are required by the building to achieve an acceptable ERL are primarily 
the same as Table 3 except the features are deemed not required by the trade-off analysis. The 
differences are (1) Fire Rated Construction: the fire resistance levels to the Basement Carpark, Level 1 
Retail and Level 3-6 Offices are permitted to achieve FRL 90/90/90 and to the Level 2 Offices are 
permitted to achieve FRL 60/60/60 which replaces “the ground floor lobby is to be separated from the 
rest of ground floor with fire rated construction achieving an FRL of 60 min”, and (2) Smoke detection, 
Sprinkler and Occupant warning system: instead of the whole building, only Level 2 to Level 6 as per 
AS1670.1, AS2118.1 and  AS1670.1, respectively. All other elements of the building design not listed 
in this table shall satisfy the requirements of the BCA DtS provisions. The ERL of the building with all 
required fire safety measures is shown in fourth and fifth column of Table 9. As it can be observed that 
the calculated ERL is approximately 22% lower than the acceptable ERL, this alternative solution is 
deemed to have met the applicable performance requirements of the BCA. 
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Although the analysis shows that sprinklers are only required on levels 2 to 6, the additional cost to 
provide sprinkler protection to the entire building will likely be largely or totally offset by the allowable 
reduction (if any)  in structural Fire Resistance Levels (FRLs). This has not been explored further. 
12 Conclusion 
This case study has demonstrated the application of QPRA to determine a feasible alternative design 
that complies with the Performance Requirements of the BCA. A systematic approach was taken to 
identify the required fire safety measures of the alternative design and prove that the design will 
exceed the accepted benchmark for ERL whilst ensuring all claims are underpinned by a 
comprehensive body of evidence. An event tree was used as the framework for the risk model. 
Statistical data and analyses were utilised to calculate corresponding probabilities and various 
correlations were used to determine design fires. After initial semi-qualitative risk analysis, a number 
fire scenarios were selected for full quantitative analysis. For fire modelling, a CFD-based model, FDS 
for Level 3-6 office areas and a two-zone model, Branzfire for scenarios in the basement carpark, Level 
1 Retail and Level 2 Office have been used. These provided ASET for each scenario. A three-
dimensional evacuation model Pathfinder was used for determining RSET. At each end node of the 
event tree, consequences were calculated through ASET-RSET analysis. With cumulative 
consequences, an ERL was calculated. A trade-off analysis tool was developed which enabled 
exploration of the solution space in terms of potential fire safety measures which facilitated 
identification of an optimal solution. The final alternative design solution includes sprinklers, smoke 
detection, toughened glazing, drenchers (wall-wetting sprinklers) and lifts. Sprinklers and drenchers 
are found to the most crucial fire safety measures.  
Overall, the case study presented in this paper shows how a QPRA approach can be used to achieve 
compliance of alternative design solutions, for buildings and other constructs, through sound 
application of engineering principles, scientific rigour and execution of the process outlined in the 
IFEG. For acceptance criteria, IFEG’s ERL methodology was adopted. However, there are alternative 
methodology available to demonstrate achieving compliance of alternative design solutions.  
References 
[1] A. B. C. Board, "National Construction Code Series Volume 1, Building Code of Australia 2013, 
Class 2 to 9 Buildings," Canberra: Australian Building Codes Board, vol. 163, 2013. 
[2] J. M. Watts and J. R. Hall, "Introduction to fire risk analysis," in SFPE Handbook of Fire 
Protection Engineering, ed: Springer, 2016, pp. 2817-2826. 
[3] B. J. Meacham, D. Charters, P. Johnson, and M. Salisbury, "Building fire risk analysis," in SFPE 
Handbook of Fire Protection Engineering, ed: Springer, 2016, pp. 2941-2991. 
[4] C. Guanquan and S. Jinhua, "Quantitative assessment of building fire risk to life safety," Risk 
Analysis: An International Journal, vol. 28, pp. 615-625, 2008. 
[5] V. Beck, "Fire safety system design using risk assessment models: developments in Australia," 
Fire Safety Science, vol. 3, pp. 45-59, 1991. 
[6] I. Thomas, I. Bennetts, S. Poon, and J. Sims, "The Effect of Fire in the Building at 140 William 
Street: A Risk Assessment," BHP Research Melbourne Laboratories, Rep No 
BHPR/ENG/R/92/044/SG2C, 1992. 
[7] A. B. C. Board, "Building code of Australia Volume2, Class 1 and Class 10 Buildings," A. B. C. 
Board, Ed., ed, 2016. 
[8] X. Zhang, X. Li, and G. Hadjisophocleous, "A probabilistic occupant evacuation model for fire 
emergencies using Monte Carlo methods," Fire Safety Journal, vol. 58, pp. 15-24, 2013. 
  
  Page | 26 
[9] G. Zhang, D. Huang, G. Zhu, and G. Yuan, "Probabilistic model for safe evacuation under the 
effect of uncertain factors in fire," Safety science, vol. 93, pp. 222-229, 2017. 
[10] M. Naser and V. Kodur, "A probabilistic assessment for classification of bridges against fire 
hazard," Fire Safety Journal, vol. 76, pp. 65-73, 2015. 
[11] G. Landucci, F. Argenti, A. Tugnoli, and V. Cozzani, "Quantitative assessment of safety barrier 
performance in the prevention of domino scenarios triggered by fire," Reliability Engineering 
& System Safety, vol. 143, pp. 30-43, 2015. 
[12] G. P. Balomenos, A. S. Genikomsou, M. A. Polak, and M. D. Pandey, "Efficient method for 
probabilistic finite element analysis with application to reinforced concrete slabs," 
Engineering Structures, vol. 103, pp. 85-101, 2015. 
[13] Y. He, "Probabilistic fire-risk-assessment function and its application in fire resistance design," 
Procedia Engineering, vol. 62, pp. 130-139, 2013. 
[14] Y.-w. Zhang, "Research on cost-benefit evaluation model for performance-based fire safety 
design of buildings," Procedia Engineering, vol. 135, pp. 537-543, 2016. 
[15] W. Poh and I. Bennetts, "Sprinklers for property protection–decision based on quantitative 
cost-benefit risk assessment," Australian Journal of Structural Engineering, vol. 6, pp. 1-10, 
2005. 
[16] R. Van Coile, G. P. Balomenos, M. D. Pandey, and R. Caspeele, "An Unbiased Method for 
Probabilistic Fire Safety Engineering, Requiring a Limited Number of Model Evaluations," Fire 
Technology, vol. 53, pp. 1705-1744, 2017. 
[17] B. Van Weyenberge, X. Deckers, R. Caspeele, and B. Merci, "Development of a full probabilistic 
QRA method for quantifying the life safety risk in complex building designs," in 11th 
Conference on performance based codes and dire safety design methods, 2016, pp. 1-12. 
[18] C. Albrecht, "Quantifying life safety: Part I: Scenario-based quantification," Fire Safety Journal, 
vol. 64, pp. 87-94, 2014. 
[19] C. Albrecht, "Quantifying life safety Part II: Quantification of fire protection systems," Fire 
Safety Journal, vol. 64, pp. 81-86, 2014. 
[20] R. Yared and B. Abdulrazak, "Risk Analysis and Assessment to Enhance Safety in a Smart 
Kitchen," Fire Technology, vol. 54, pp. 555-577, 2018. 
[21] M. C. Bruns, "Estimating the Flashover Probability of Residential Fires Using Monte Carlo 
Simulations of the MQH Correlation," Fire Technology, vol. 54, pp. 187-210, 2018. 
[22] A. B. C. Board, "International fire engineering guidelines," Canberra: Australian Building Codes 
Board, 2005. 
[23] C. f. C. P. S. o. t. A. I. o. C. Engineers, "Guidelines for developing quantitative safety risk 
criteria," in LEARNING, ed. New Jersey John Wiley & Sons, 2009. 
[24] ISO, "ISO 31000:2009 Risk Management Principles and guidelines," ed, 2009. 
[25] V. Babrauskas and R. D. Peacock, "Heat release rate: the single most important variable in fire 
hazard," Fire safety journal, vol. 18, pp. 255-272, 1992. 
[26] K. A. Moinuddin and I. R. Thomas, "An experimental study of fire development in deep 
enclosures and a new HRR–time–position model for a deep enclosure based on ventilation 
factor," Fire and Materials, vol. 33, pp. 157-185, 2009. 
[27] K. A. Moinuddin, J. S. Al-Menhali, K. Prasannan, and I. R. Thomas, "Rise in structural steel 
temperatures during ISO 9705 room fires," Fire Safety Journal, vol. 46, pp. 480-496, 2011. 
[28] P. T. Enright, "Work Health & Safety legislation; the fire engineer’s neglected duty?," Case 
Studies in Fire Safety, vol. 2, pp. 1-8, 2014. 
[29] R. Robinson and G. Francis, "SFAIRP vs ALARP," CORE 2014: Rail Transport For A Vital Economy, 
p. 661, 2014. 
[30] R. Van Coile, D. Hopkin, D. Lange, G. Jomaas, and L. Bisby, "The need for hierarchies of 
acceptance criteria for probabilistic risk assessments in fire engineering," Fire Technology, pp. 
1-36, 2018. 
[31] A. B. C. Board, "Guide to the Building Code of Australia," ed, 2011. 
  
  Page | 27 
[32] I. Bennetts, K. Poh, S. Poon, I. Thomas, A. Lee, P. Beever, et al., Fire Safety in Shopping Centres: 
Final Research Report: Fire Code Reform Centre, 1998. 
[33] A. B. o. Statistics. (2011, 04.08.2013). One in five Australians with a disability. Available: 
http://www.abs.gov.au/ausstats/abs@.nsf/mediareleasesbytitle/49BEE5774F0FB1B1CA256
E8B00830DF6?OpenDocument 
[34] N. F. Brigades, "NSW Fire Brigades Annual Statistical Report 2002/03," Sydney: Author, NSW, 
Australia2004. 
[35] N. F. Brigades, "NSW Fire Brigades Annual Statistical Report 2003/04," Sydney: Author, NSW, 
Australia2005. 
[36] N. F. Brigades, "NSW Fire Brigades Annual Statistical Report 2004/05," Sydney: Author, NSW, 
Australia2006. 
[37] N. F. Brigades, "NSW Fire Brigades Annual Statistical Report 2005/06," Sydney: Author, NSW, 
Australia2007. 
[38] N. F. Brigades, "NSW Fire Brigades Annual Statistical Report 2006/07," Sydney: Author, NSW, 
Australia2008. 
[39] N. Z. F. Services, "Statistical Data of Fire Events for 1999-2003," 2004. 
[40] A. Standard, "Standard 1428.1-2001:‘Design for access and mobility, Part 1: General 
requirements for access: New building work’," Standards Australia. 
[41] B. Dryne, "Fire incident statistics report " Arup, Australia2001. 
[42] G. E. CIBSE, "Fire engineering," The Chartered Institution of Building Services Engineers, 
London, UK, 2010. 
[43] N. Z. M. o. B. I. Employment, C/VM2 Verification Method: Framework for Fire Safety Design, 
2013. 
[44] J. Philip, "SFPE Handbook of Fire Protection Engineering (3rd edit.)," ed: SFPE, 2005. 
[45] M. F. E. S. Board and C. S. Directorate, "GUIDELINE Fire Brigade Intervention Model (FBIM) 
General Provisions GL-17," ed. Melbourne, 2010. 
[46] K. McGrattan, S. Hostikka, R. McDermott, J. Floyd, C. Weinschenk, and K. Overholt, "Fire 
dynamics simulator, user’s guide," NIST special publication, vol. 1019, p. 20, 2013. 
[47] I. ThunderHead Engineering Consultants, "PathFinder: technical reference," Manhattan2013. 
[48] I. R. Thomas, K. Moinuddin, and I. D. Bennetts, "The Effect of Fuel Quantity and Location on 
Small Enclosures Fires," May 2007, vol. 17, p. 85, 2007. 
[49] K. A. Moinuddin, T. D. Nguyen, and H. Mahmud, "Designing an experimental rig for developing 
a fire severity model using numerical simulation," Fire and Materials, vol. 41, pp. 871-883, 
2017. 
[50] J. A. Capote, D. Alvear, O. Abreu, A. Cuesta, and V. Alonso, "A stochastic approach for 
simulating human behaviour during evacuation process in passenger trains," Fire technology, 
vol. 48, pp. 911-925, 2012. 
[51] H. Nelson and F. Mowrer, "Emergency movement, the SFPE handbook of fire protection 
engineering, ed," DiNenno P., Walton DW National Fire Protection Association, 2002. 
[52] J. R. Hall, "US Experience with sprinklers and other automatic fire extinguishing equipment," 
National Fire Protection Association Quincy, MA2010. 
[53] B. S. Institution, "PD-7974 Application of Fire Safety Engineering Principles to the Design of 
Buildings: Code of Practice," ed: BSI, 2003. 
[54] MIL‐STD‐882D, "Standard Practice for System Safety," 2000. 
[55] P. Holborn, P. Nolan, J. Golt, and N. Townsend, "Fires in workplace premises: risk data," Fire 
Safety Journal, vol. 37, pp. 303-327, 2002. 
[56] K. Moinuddin and I. Thomas, "Reliability of sprinkler system in Australian high rise office 
buildings," Fire safety journal, vol. 63, pp. 52-68, 2014. 
[57] S. Australia, "Sprinklers Simplified," ISBN 0-7337-3037-X2000. 
[58] P. Holborn, P. Nolan, and J. Golt, "An analysis of fire sizes, fire growth rates and times between 
events using data from fire investigations," Fire Safety Journal, vol. 39, pp. 481-524, 2004. 
  
  Page | 28 
[59] T. S. Sharma, "Feasibility and design considerations for the use of lifts as an emergency exit in 
apartment buildings," Queensland University of Technology, 2008. 
[60] C. Wade, BRANZFIRE Technical reference guide: BRANZ, 2000. 
[61] T. Jin, "Visibility through fire smoke (No. 42): report of Fire Research Institute of Japan," 1976. 
[62] K. Fridolf, K. Andrée, D. Nilsson, and H. Frantzich, "The impact of smoke on walking speed," 
Fire and Materials, vol. 38, pp. 744-759, 2014. 
[63] P. A. Thompson and E. W. Marchant, "A computer model for the evacuation of large building 
populations," Fire safety journal, vol. 24, pp. 131-148, 1995. 
[64] J. H. Klote and J. A. Milke, Principles of smoke management: American Society of Heating, 
Refrigerating and Air-Conditioning Engineers Atlanta, USA, 2002. 
[65] L. Staffansson, Selecting design fires: Brandteknik och Riskhantering, Lunds tekniska högskola, 
2010. 
[66] R. L. Alpert, "Calculation of response time of ceiling-mounted fire detectors," Fire technology, 
vol. 8, pp. 181-195, 1972. 
  
  
  Page | 29 
Appendix A: Quantified Design Fire 
Design fires are expressed as t-squared fires where: 
?̇? = 𝛼𝑡2  
𝑤ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑒, ?̇? = 𝐻𝑒𝑎𝑡 𝑅𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑎𝑠𝑒 𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑒 (𝑘𝑊), 𝛼 = 𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ 𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑒 (
𝑘𝑊
𝑠2
) , 𝑡 = 𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒 𝑠𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑒 𝑖𝑔𝑛𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 (𝑠𝑒𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑑𝑠) 
HRR is escalated over time according to the specified growth rate until sprinklers activate or until the 
peak HRR is reached.  The HRR then remains constant until 80% of fuel has been consumed at which 
point the fire begins a t-squared decay until all available fuel has been combusted [65]. 
Sprinkler activation times have been calculated using FDS for design fires 1 and 2 (office fires), and 
using Alperts Correlation [66] for design fires 4 and 5 (retail fires) and 7 and 8 (carpark fires).  To 
account for sprinkler efficacy in the scenarios where sprinklers activate, statistical data from Table 6.3 
of HB-147 [57] was used to calculate the probability of two sub-scenarios (1) Only one sprinkler head 
is required to control the fire (sprinklers control fire early); and (2) Four sprinkler heads are required 
to control the fire (sprinklers control fire late).For Design Fires 1-6, 95th percentile fire growth rates 
taken from Table 17 of Holborn et al. [58] according to occupancy type.  
Peak HRR for Design Fires 1, 2, 4, 5, 7 and 8 are based on the assumption that HRR will remain constant 
once sprinklers have activated. Effectively it is assumed that sprinklers will control, but not suppress 
or extinguish the fire. Peak HRR for Design Fires 2 and 4 taken from Table 10.3 of  Staffannson [65]. 
Peak HRR and growth rates for design fires 7-9 are taken from C/VM2  [43]. HRRPUA was taken from 
Table 10.4 of  Staffannson [65] based on fuel load type. The HRR versus time curves for each of the 
design fires is shown in Figure A.1. 
Fuel load density taken from IFEG 2005 [22], Tables 3.4.1a and 3.4.1b based on the most applicable 
occupancy type and most conservative value between 3.4.1a and the 90% fractile value from 3.4.1b.  
Fuel load based on the dominant fuel load in the affected area/floor for each scenario. Species yield 
and radiative fraction taken from C/VM2  [43] which is based on a mix of materials. However, modern 
materials contain a significantly greater mix of polyurethane, in particular for a modern office opting 
for a larger breakout space with soft seating. This uncertainty was accounted for by picking the worst 
case scenario or what would be the pessimistic extremity of any range capturing uncertainty. Given 
the associated peak HRR in the standard are in most cases higher than those prescribed above, the 
species yield and radiative fraction is considered conservative.  Further, comparison with occupancy-
specific recommended yields from Table 10.6 of Staffannson [65] shows that the values used above 
are conservative. 
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(a) HRR vs Time: Design Fires 1 - 3 
 
(b) HRR vs Time: Design Fires 4 - 6 
 
(c) - HRR vs Time: Design Fires 7 – 9 
Figure A.1 - HRR vs Time curves for Design Fires
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Table A.1 – Schematic Design Fires 
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Electrical fault, unattended heat source, 
abandoned/discarded material 
Early 86 0.016 118 250 86 
Office, business 
800 0.35 0.07 0.04 20 1.5 1.0 
2 
Electrical fault, unattended heat source, 
abandoned/discarded material 
Late 237 0.016 899 250 237 
Office, business 
800 0.35 0.07 0.04 20 1.5 1.0 
3 
Electrical fault, unattended heat source, 
abandoned/discarded material 
Fail Fail 0.016 5000 250 559 
Office, business 
800 0.35 0.07 0.04 20 1.5 1.0 
4 
Electrical fault, unattended heat source, 
abandoned/discarded material 
Early 126 0.101 1603 250 126 
Shops 
1100 0.35 0.07 0.04 20 1.5 1.0 
5 
Electrical fault, unattended heat source, 
abandoned/discarded material 
Late 173 0.101 3023 250 173 
Shops 
1100 0.35 0.07 0.04 20 1.5 1.0 
6 
Electrical fault, unattended heat source, 
abandoned/discarded material 
Fail Fail 0.101 10000 250 315 
Shops 
1100 0.35 0.07 0.04 20 1.5 1.0 
7 
Electrical fault, abandoned/discarded 
material 
Early 210 0.0117 516 250 210 
Underground 
garage, private 
200 0.35 0.07 0.04 20 1.5 1.0 
8 
Electrical fault, abandoned/discarded 
material 
Late 288 0.0117 970 250 288 
Underground 
garage, private 
200 0.35 0.07 0.04 20 1.5 1.0 
9 
Electrical fault, abandoned/discarded 
material 
Fail Fail 0.0117 20000 250 1307 
Underground 
garage, private 
200 0.35 0.07 0.04 20 1.5 1.0 
 
 
